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Recent Developments 
Scbocbet v. State: MARYLAND'S 
UNNATURAL OR PERVERTED 
SEXUAL PRACTICES STATUTE 
DOES NOT APPLY TO CON-
SENSUAL, NONCOMMERCIAL, 
HETEROSEXUAL ACTIVITY 
BETWEEN ADULTS IN PRIVATE 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
recently held that a statute prOviding 
criminal penalties for "unnatural or per-
verted sexual practice[s]," did not en-
compass consensual, noncommercial, 
heterosexual activity between adults in 
private. Md. Ann. Code art 27, §554 
(1987 & Supp. 1990). In Schochet v. 
State, 320 Md. 714, 580 A.2d 176 
( 1990), the court avoided the issue of 
whether the statute violated the consti-
tutional right of privacy by employing a 
statutory construction analysis. 
Steven Adam Schochet was charged in 
the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
county with various sexual offenses aris-
ing out of events occurring on October 
3, 1986. Dovie Sullivan, the complaining 
witness, accused the defendant of forc-
ing her, against her will and without 
consent, to perform various sexual acts 
with him, including vaginal intercourse, 
fellatio, and anal intercourse. Schochet 
v. State, 320 Md. at 717-18, 580A.2d at 
177-78 ( 1990). Schochet denied having 
anal intercourse with the complaining 
witness, but admitted to engaging in 
consensual vaginal intercourse and fel-
latio. Id. at 723, 580 A.2d at 180. The 
jury, believing Schochet's version of the 
incident, returned verdicts of not guilty 
as to the offenses which required lack of 
consent. Schochet was also found not 
guilty of sodomy. The jury, however, did 
find Schochet guilty of fellatio, an un-
natural or perverted sexual practice as 
described in section 554, after being 
instructed that a lack of consent on the 
part of the complaining witness was not 
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an element of that offense. Id. at 721-22, 
580 A.2d at 179-80. 
On appeal, Schochet argued that the 
statute was "unconstitutional as applied 
to private and noncommercial sexual 
acts between consenting heterosexual 
adults." Id. at 723, 580 A.2d at 180. 
Schochet's argument that the statute 
violated his constitutional right of pri-
vacy was unpersuasive. A divided Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed 
the conviction, finding no '''constitu-
tional protection for sexual activity -
orthodox or unorthodox, heterosexual 
or homosexual - at least outside of 
marriage.'" Id. (quoting Schochet v. 
State, 75 Md. App. 314, 339, 541 A.2d 
183, 195 (1988)). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari, reversed Schochet's 
conviction and held that section 554 did 
not encompass consensual, noncommer-
cial, heterosexual activity between 
adults in private. The court, therefore, 
did not reach the question of whether 
there was a constitutional right of pri-
vacy in this case. 
In reaching its conclusion, the court 
of appeals relied on the principle of 
statutory construction that if "'a legisla-
tive act is susceptible of two reasonable 
interpretations, one of which would not 
involve a decision as to the constitution-
ality of the act while the other would, 
the construction which avoids the deter-
mination of constitutionality is to be 
preferred.'" Id at 725, 580 A.2d at 181 
( quoting Maryland State Bd of Ramer 
Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 505, 
312 A.2d 216, 221 (1973)). Recogniz-
ing that section 554 could be inter-
preted as violating a constitutional right 
of privacy, the court chose to adopt an 
interpretation of the statute that would 
avoid a constitutional determination. 
The State disagreed with the application 
of this principle, and argued that the 
court could only avoid a decision on the 
constitutional question if the statute 
was reasonably susceptible to different 
interpretations. The state asserted that 
the plain language of section 554 was 
not susceptible of more than one interpre-
tation.ld. at 728-29, 580 A.2d at 183. 
The court disagreed, reasoning that 
the broad, sweeping language of section 
554 rendered the statute susceptible to 
different constructions. Id. at 729,580 
A.2dat 183. In support ofits conclusion, 
the court relied on Maryland cases which 
have given general statutes (such as sec-
tion 554) narrow constructions so as to 
avoid any constitutional issues. Id. at 
729-31,580 A.2d at 183-84. The court 
further noted the rulings of other juris-
dictions which have interpreted such 
statutes similarly. Id. at 731,580 A.2d at 
184. 
Lastly, the court noted that although 
cases involving prosecutions under sec-
tion 554 had been previously reviewed, 
those involved homosexual activity, 
sexual acts with minors, nonconsensual 
sexual acts, and sexual activity in public. 
However, no prior cases involving pros-
ecutions dealing with consensual, non-
commercial, heterosexual activity be-
tween adults in private had been re-
viewed. The court relied on this as 
another indication that such conduct 
was not meant to be encompassed by 
the statute. Id at 734, 580 A.2d at 185. 
In his dissenting opinion, ChiefJudge 
Murphy argued that the plain language 
of section 554 was not susceptible to 
more than one reasonable interpreta-
tion, and since the type of activity in 
question was not specifically excluded 
in the statute, it must be covered by 
section 554. Id. at 736-37, 580 A.2d at 
187 (Murphy, CJ., dissenting). The dis-
sent further asserted that the constitu-
tional issue presented should have been 
considered. He indicated that, had the 
issue been considered, he would have 
held that section 554 does not infringe 
upon the constitutional right of privacy. 
Id. at 737, 580 A.2d at 187. 
In Scbochet v. State, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland considerably nar-
rowed the scope of section 554 by 
excluding from its application consen-
sual, noncommercial, heterosexual ac-
tivities between adults in private. Al-
though, as the court points out in its 
opinion, section 554 is still viable as ap-
plied to activities not expressly excluded 
by its opinion, the scope and constitu-
tionality of its application to such activi-
ties remains in question. By artfully 
avoiding the constitutional issue pre-
sented in this case, the court avoided the 
possibility of being reviewed by the 
United States Supreme Court. However, 
this has merely postponed a seemingly 
inevitable ruling which will define the 
extent of the State's control over the 
most intimate and personal aspects of 
the lives of its citizenry. 
- Mark K. Boyer 
Cooter & Gell fl. Hartmarx Corpora-
tion: VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF 
FRIVOLOUS LAWSUIT WILL 
NOT PROTECT PLAINTIFF 
FROM IMPOSITION OF RULE 11 
SANCTIONS 
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 
no S. Ct. 2447 (1990), the Supreme 
Court resolved a split among the federal 
circuit courts in their application of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The 
Court held that a plaintiffs voluntary 
dismissal did not destroy the jurisdic-
tion of the federal district court to 
award Rule 11 sanctions. Additionally, 
the Court held that the appropriate 
standard of review on appeal was an 
abuse of discretion standard. However, 
the Court ruled that expenses incurred 
in an appeal of sanctions were not 
includable in the amount of the mone-
tary award. 
Hartmarx Corporation ("Hartmarx") 
filed a breach of contract action against 
Danik Incorporated ("Danik"), who, 
represented by the law firm of Cooter & 
Gell, filed a counterclaim to that action. 
The district court found in favor of 
Hartmarx in both matters. Thereafter, 
Danik filed two antitrust complaints 
against Hartmarx, one of which was the 
subject of the appeal. 
The complaint in question alleged, 
inter alia, the existence of a nationwide 
conspiracy to fix prices and to eliminate 
competition. Hartmarx moved to dis-
miss the complaint and for sanctions 
under Rule 11 based principally on the 
grounds that the suit had no basis in fact. 
Danik filed a notice of voluntary dismis-
sal of the antitrust complaint which 
became effective in June 1984. There-
after, the court entertained argument on 
the Rule 11 motion. 
In December 1987, the district court 
granted the Rule 11 motion for sanc-
tions and awarded costs and fees for 
defense of the action against Danik and 
Cooter & Gell. The court of appeals 
affirmed, but additionally ruled that the 
matter be remanded to the district court 
where the expenses incurred as a result 
of the appeal should be assessed against 
Danik and Cooter & Gell. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari. 
The Court considered three issues on 
appeal. First, whether a district court 
may impose Rule 11 sanctions on a 
plaintiff who voluntarily dismissed a 
complaint. Second, what was the ap-
propriate standard of review in the 
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Third, 
whether awarding attorney fees incurred 
on appeal of the sanctions was autho-
rized under Rule 11. 
The Court first addressed Danik's con-
tention that its voluntary dismissal pur-
suant to Rule 41 (a)( 1) automatically 
deprived the district court of jurisdic-
tion over the Rule 11 motion, and thus, 
the sanctions and award of attorney fees 
and costs were improper.ld. at 2454-55. 
In its analysis, the Court considered 
both the language of and the purposes 
behind the promulgation of Rule 11 and 
Rule 4I(a)(I). 
Rule 11 requires that an attorney or 
party offering a paper to a court must 
sign that paper. By signing, the attorney 
or party certifies that: 
the signer has read the ... paper; 
that to the best of the signer's 
knowledge, information, and belief 
formed after reasonable inquiry it 
is well grounded in fact and is war-
ranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of exist-
ing law, and that it is not inter-
posed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnec-
essary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation. 
[Fed. R Civ. P. 11.] 
If signed in violation of the rule, the 
court "shall" impose upon the attorney 
or his client "an appropriate sanction, 
which may include an order to pay to 
the other party or parties the amount of 
the reasonable expenses incurred be-
cause ofthe filing" of the paper. [d. The 
Court determined that the purpose of 
Rule 11 is to deter baseless lawsuits and 
to streamline the judicial process. Cooter 
& Gell, 110 S.Ct. at 2454. 
In contrast, the purpose of Rule 41 (a) 
( 1 ) is to limit a plaintiff's ability to dis-
miss an action without prejudice. Specif-
ically, the provision allows a plaintiff 
"one free dismissal" without the per-
mission of the adverse party or the 
court, provided certain procedural re-
quirements are followed.ld. at 2456-57. 
However, the Court stated, Rule 41 
(a)( 1) did not secure the plaintiffs 
right to file baseless papers.ld. at 2457. 
The Court reasoned that if a litigant 
could purge his Rule 11 violation merely 
by taking a dismissal, he would lose all 
incentive to investigate more carefully 
before serving and filing papers. [d. 
The Court rejected the petitioner's 
argument and found that the language 
and policies behind Rule 11 were con-
sistent with the district court's pOSition 
that it had authority to rule on the 
motion after the dismissal of the action. 
[d. The Court found that the jurisdiction 
of the district court was invoked when 
the underlying complaint was filed and 
was not destroyed by the voluntary dis-
missal. The Court further found that the 
Rule 11 motion was a collateral issue, 
not a judgment on the merits, and there-
fore, the imposition of sanctions did not 
deprive the plaintiff of his Rule 41 (a)( 1) 
right to voluntarily dismiss without prej-
udice. Thus, the Court held the award of 
attorney fees and costs was properly 
made after the voluntary dismissal of the 
suit. [d. 
Similarly, the Court rejected the peti-
tioner's contention that the court of 
appeals erred in applying an abuse of 
'-disci'etion standard in reviewing the 
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. In its 
analysis, the Court compared the lan-
guage in the Equal Access to Justice Act 
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